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Abstract 
How, if at all, does the Commission’s expertise inform intergovernmental decision-making within the EU? In this article, 
we aim to capture the relationship between the Commission’s expertise and its influence within intergovernmental pol-
icy-areas through a study of Commission influence in two least likely sectors: security and defence policies (military 
mission Atalanta and EU Maritime Security Strategy) and external migration (EU mobility partnerships with third coun-
tries). In these cases we observe that the Commission strongly informs policy developments even though it has only 
limited formal competences. To explore whether and, if so, how this influence is linked to its expertise, we develop and 
consider two hypotheses: The expert authority hypothesis and the expert arguments hypothesis. To identify possible 
additional channels of influence, we also consider the relevance of two alternative hypotheses: The strategic coalition 
hypothesis and the institutional circumvention hypothesis. We find that the Commission’s use of its expertise is indeed 
key to understanding its de facto influence within policy-areas where its formal competences remain limited. Our find-
ings add to the existing literature by revealing how expertise matters. Specifically, our cases show that the Commission 
informs intergovernmental decision-making by successfully linking discussions to policy-areas where it holds expert au-
thority. However, the Commission also informs EU policies by circumventing the formal lines of intergovernmental de-
cision-making, and by cooperating with member states that share its preference for further integration. 
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1. Introduction 
This article explores the relationship between expertise 
and the European Commission’s influence on outcomes 
in European Union’s (EU) formally intergovernmental is-
sue-areas. We start from the observation that despite de 
jure having only limited competence in these domains, a 
growing number of studies suggest that, de facto, the 
Commission increasingly informs their decision-
making—in security, defence, migration, and education 
(Gornitzka, 2009; Jørgensen, Oberthür, & Shahin, 2011; 
Riddervold & Sjursen, 2012). Other studies tell us that 
unpacking the ways in which international bureaucracies 
use their “expert knowledge” may hold the key to un-
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derstanding their impact on policy outcomes (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 1999, 2004; Checkel, 2001; Copeland & 
James, 2014; Cross, 2010; Haas, 1992; Hooghe, 2005; 
Joerges & Neyer, 1997; Martens, 2008). Yet whether, 
and, if so, how, the Commission’s observed influence on 
formally intergovernmental policies is linked to its exper-
tise remains unexplored in the literature. This is puzzling 
because, as Hooghe (2001, p. 7) argues, the Commission 
is “a body of unelected officials appointed for their ex-
pertise” (emphasis added). In Community policy-areas 
where it has competence, Commission expertise is a well-
established indicator of why it has been able to success-
fully propose new regulatory measures. Hence, our re-
search question is: How, if at all, does the Commission’s 
expertise inform intergovernmental decision-making? 
To tease out how the Commission’s expertise puta-
tively influences formally intergovernmental EU poli-
cies, we develop and operationalise two hypotheses. 
The first, the expert authority hypothesis, builds on so-
ciological institutionalist role theory and suggests that 
the European executive may influence EU policies by 
linking intergovernmental discussions to policy-areas 
where it holds expert authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004; Elgstrøm & Smith, 2006). The second, the expert 
arguments hypothesis, builds on communicative action 
theory and suggests that the Commission may influ-
ence member states’ decisions by presenting convinc-
ing expertise-based arguments (Eriksen, 2005; Rid-
dervold, 2011; Risse, 2000; Sjursen, 2004). We apply 
them to study the Commission’s influence in two least 
likely sectors: security and defence policies (the cases 
of Atalanta military mission and EU Maritime Security 
Strategy, EUMSS), and external migration policies (EU 
mobility partnerships). In these cases, the European 
executive’s formal competences are limited, but it is 
seen to be strongly informing policy outcomes. We ex-
pect both hypotheses to contribute to capturing its 
ability to penetrate sectors and decision-making pro-
cesses where we would not ordinarily anticipate a 
strong Commission impact. It may also be that, howev-
er, the Commission’s influence is linked to other fac-
tors than its expertise. To control for this possibility, we 
consider the relevance of two alternative hypotheses: 
the strategic coalition-building hypothesis and the insti-
tutional circumvention hypothesis. By examining the 
relevance of these four analytically distinct, yet empiri-
cally overlapping, hypotheses, we seek to offer a more 
comprehensive understanding of the relationship be-
tween Commission expertise and its influence in inter-
governmental EU policies. In so doing, we also aim to 
provide an improved understanding of the different 
functions of expertise in EU decision-making processes, 
more generally, and the Commission’s role within Euro-
pean intergovernmental policymaking, more specifically. 
This article is organised as follows. First, we develop 
and operationalise two hypotheses concerning how the 
Commission may putatively use its expertise to influ-
ence EU intergovernmental policymaking before pre-
senting the two alternative hypotheses. Second, we 
show how the Commission’s de facto influence over EU 
intergovernmental decisions exceeds its formal compe-
tence in security, foreign and external migration policy-
areas. Third, we analyse how the observed influence 
may be explained by considering the relevance of our 
four hypotheses. We conclude by discussing our overall 
findings and their implications for studies of Commis-
sion expertise and EU intergovernmental policies.  
2. How Can the Commission Influence through Its 
Expertise?  
There is a rich literature in both international relations 
and EU studies that examine the linkage between non-
governmental actors’ expert knowledge and their influ-
ence in international policymaking (cf. Barnett & Finne-
more, 2004; Busch & Liese, 2014; Elgström & Smith, 
2006; Joerges & Neyer, 1997). Most of this literature 
assumes that all actors, regardless of their institutional 
affiliation, are rational and capable of adapting to 
changing situations. What differ in their assumptions 
are the explanatory mechanisms involved in this 
change process. Based on these studies, we develop 
two hypotheses concerning how the European execu-
tive may influence intergovernmental decisions 
through its expertise: (1) influence by evoking the role 
of expert authority (expert authority hypothesis), and 
(2) influence by presenting convincing expert argu-
ments (expert arguments hypothesis). 
The expert authority hypothesis builds on the in-
sights of sociological institutionalist role theory. Here, 
roles refer to “patterns of expected or appropriate be-
haviour” (Elgstrøm & Smith, 2006, p. 5) or “those ex-
pectations that other actors (alter) prescribe and ex-
pect the role-beholder (ego) to enact” (Kirsten & Maull, 
1996, cited in Aggestam, 2006, p. 18). Put simply, roles 
define expectations according to behaviour in line with 
March and Olsen’s (1998) “logic of appropriateness”. It 
follows that one would expect that “actors seek to fulfil 
the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a 
membership in a political community or group, and the 
ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions” 
(March & Olsen, 2006, p. 689). Building on this per-
spective, the decision-makers’ expectations of the 
Commission’s role would determine the influence it is 
able to exercise. If a particular issue is defined or treat-
ed as intergovernmental, the corresponding expecta-
tion of the Commission’s role or appropriate behaviour 
would be that its involvement should be limited.  
The EU is, however, a complex institution. This 
complexity suggests that, if a different role-expectation 
is introduced, the Commission’s room for manoeuvre 
in intergovernmental settings could increase. In partic-
ular, we suggest that the European executive could ex-
pand its capacity to act across intergovernmental issue-
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 61-72 63 
areas if the role it plays in Community policy-areas (i.e., 
those at the heart of creating the Single Market) is 
evoked. This is because, within Community policy-
areas, the Commission is the recognised and acknowl-
edged authority; its particular involvement and influ-
ence in policymaking are taken for granted (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 2004). Hooghe (2001) tells us that the 
Commission suggests, controls, and manages policy 
developments in the various policy-areas its depart-
ments and services (Directorates-General, DGs) cover. 
On this basis, we expect that the Commission may in-
fluence EU intergovernmental decisions if its “Commu-
nity expert authority” is successfully evoked when the 
intergovernmental issues under discussion are linked 
with those in which it has Treaty competence. If suc-
cessful, we would observe changes in the policymak-
ers’ expectations of its involvement: instead of playing 
an outsider’s role, the European executive would be 
expected to enact its “normal” role as the competent 
policy initiator and guardian of the Treaties. 
Analytically, our expert authority hypothesis is akin 
to Rittberger’s (2012) hypothesis of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
empowerment of the European Parliament. He argues 
that the introduction of qualified-majority voting au-
tomatically led member states to accept Parliamentary 
involvement in policymaking: When applying particular 
decision-making procedures, the Parliament should 
play its role of co-decision-maker. Similarly, our expert 
authority hypothesis anticipates that linking an inter-
governmental issue area (e.g., security) to Community 
policy-areas would lead to the acceptance of Commis-
sion participation and influence over such decision-
making. Following Rittberger (2012), we would expect 
to observe the following if the expert authority hypoth-
esis is valid: (1) Commission proposals or suggestions 
would be linked to existing Community policy-areas; (2) 
Commission involvement in decision-making would not 
be contested; and (3) Commission proposals and sug-
gestions would be adopted more or less automatically, 
i.e., with “little justification but also hardly any articula-
tion” (Rittberger, 2012, p. 32). When this role is acti-
vated through referencing Community issues, the 
member states are more inclined “to copy what the 
Commission says and does” (Martens, 2008, p. 637). 
In new policymaking situations, however, studies 
find that there is often little opportunity in practice for 
copying, role-enactment or institutionalised behaviour 
(cf. Checkel, 2001; Eriksen & Fossum, 2000; Risse, 2000; 
Rittberger, 2012). When facing new developments that 
have not previously been discussed nor regulated at the 
EU-level, such as defence or environmental issues, there 
is less certainty about which norms and roles should ap-
ply. Thus, instead of mimicking earlier behaviour or 
drawing on established role-expectations, decision-
makers “have to figure out the situation in which they 
act, apply the appropriate norms, or choose among 
conflicting rules” (Risse, 2000, p. 6). As Rosén (2014, p. 
4) notes, norms have to be activated in order to have 
an impact on decision-making. We know that in Council 
meetings where foreign policies are discussed, Europe-
an policymakers present and assess norms and infor-
mation before any action is taken (Lewis, 2011). Put 
simply, norms are not seen as given, but are instead ar-
ticulated, justified, discussed, and evaluated.  
Based on these insights, we suggest an additional 
hypothesis of how the Commission’s expertise may pu-
tatively influence intergovernmental EU policies: The ex-
pert arguments hypothesis. This hypothesis builds on 
communicative action theory’s basic assumption that 
decision-makers are communicatively rational, meaning 
that they have the ability to offer reasons for their posi-
tions and actions, and to assess reasons others give (De-
itelhoff, 2009; Eriksen & Fossum, 2000; Riddervold, 2011; 
Risse, 2000; Sjursen, 2004). When applying a communica-
tive approach in descriptive or explanatory studies, there 
is thus an underlying assumption that actors are able to 
learn on the basis of arguments others present. Conse-
quently, the arguments and reasons provided may lead to 
agreement on a given policy (Deitelhoff, 2009; Eriksen, 
2005; Sjursen, 2004). As Eriksen and Fossum (2000, p. 
257) put it: “Co-operation comes about when the process 
of reason-giving generates a capacity for change of view-
points”. Similarly, Sjursen (2004, p. 115) argues that it is 
through a communicative process in which arguments 
are rationally assessed and their relevance for policy deci-
sions established. The arguments leading to agreements 
could refer to material gains, threats or promises as part 
of a bargaining game, but they could also refer to ex-
pert knowledge or different types of norms. 
This perspective may be useful for understanding 
the European executive’s influence because it allows us 
to specify a micro-mechanism through which Commis-
sion expertise may affect intergovernmental decision-
making. The “explanatory power” of arguments, ac-
cording to Eriksen (2005, p. 17), “is based on the moti-
vational force of reason, namely, that insights into 
good reasons have behavioural consequences” (em-
phasis original). Specifically, we suggest that the Com-
mission may exercise influence through the mechanism 
of argument-based learning: If it presents expertise-
based arguments that (at least some of) the decision-
makers perceive as convincing and therefore change 
their positions accordingly (Riddervold, 2011). If the 
expert arguments hypothesis accounts for its influence 
in formally intergovernmental issue-areas, we expect 
to observe the following: (a) evidence of the European 
executive justifying its proposals by explaining them 
based on its expert knowledge; (b) evidence confirming 
that Commission arguments affected the decision-
makers’ positions and thus the policies they eventually 
adopt. Indications of (b) could come in the form of 
learning: Decision-makers justifying their positions in a 
similar way as the Commission’s position.  
While our focus is on specifying the ways in which 
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the Commission influences intergovernmental deci-
sions through its expertise, we do not exclude the pos-
sibility that its expert knowledge may account for only 
a part, or even none, of the explanation. To control for 
this possibility, and thus tease out the extent to which 
expertise accounts for the influence observed, we also 
consider the relevance of two alternative hypotheses. 
We developed these hypotheses from two sets of 
mainstream literature in international relations and EU 
studies: rational-choice theory and institutionalist the-
ory. The first alternative hypothesis—the strategic coa-
lition hypothesis—stems from the well-known rational-
choice bargaining literature. It proposes that the Com-
mission’s capacity to influence intergovernmental poli-
cies may be due to its ability to build alliances with 
member states that share its preferences (cf. Pollack, 
1997; Schmidt, 2001, p. 41; Tallberg, 2008).  
The second alternative hypothesis—the institution-
al circumvention hypothesis—assumes that the Com-
mission’s ability to influence policy developments is 
linked to “opportunities and constraints in the internal 
and external environment” (Olsen, 2009, p. 25). More 
precisely, building on Egeberg (2006), we consider 
whether the Commission has exploited the unique EU 
organisational structure to informally bypass or “cir-
cumvent” the established intergovernmental decision-
making structure. In instances of institutional circum-
vention, we expect that it may occur in at least two 
ways: (i) the Commission cooperates directly with na-
tional bureaucrats to indirectly influence the member 
states’ positions (bureaucrats prepare national posi-
tions, but do not decide); or (ii) the Commission coop-
erates with other EU-level institutions (e.g., the military 
committee or the European External Action Service, 
EEAS) to affect EU intergovernmental policies. We treat 
all four hypotheses as complementary rather than as 
mutually exclusive in the analysis. The aim of these hy-
potheses is thus to help capture empirical realities, and 
their relevance may vary across the different cases.  
Methodologically, we adopt an interpretative ap-
proach and seek to uncover the Commission’s involve-
ment and influence in three decision-making processes 
from the actors’ perspective (Eliaeson, 2002, p. 52). To 
do so, we define influence in an inter-relational way to 
mean that the Commission has influence when evidence 
suggests that its interactions with other actors during 
the decision-making process affected the contents of EU 
policies or positions (Riddervold, 2015). The Commis-
sion’s influence over policy outcomes may be strong or 
weak, short or long-term, direct or accumulative, but we 
consider these to be empirical questions. Our definition of 
influence is thus broader than the conventional under-
standing, where actor A’s influence is linked to whether 
or not he/she can “cause” or implicitly coerce actor B to 
do something he/she would otherwise not have done 
(Dahl, 1957). Similarly, we define expertise widely to re-
fer to both coordinative and practical “know-how” or 
“ways of doing things” and sector-specific, specialist 
knowledge (cf. Chou, 2012a). We define “influence” and 
“expertise” broadly to enable us to account for the em-
pirical complexity of multi-level decision-making. 
Our data for Atalanta and the EUMSS consists of 26 
semi-structured interviews with participating actors, 
follow-up interviews (phone, email), and primary doc-
uments. We also obtained the different drafts of the 
Communication and the EUMSS (from 2012─2014), and 
observed some of the informal discussions between 
the Commission and member state officials in May 
2014, prior to the Council’s decision to adopt the Strat-
egy. For EU mobility partnerships, we rely on 30 semi-
structured interviews carried out between September 
2009 and August 2010, primary documents, and pub-
lished studies. The majority of our interviewees agreed 
to speak only under the condition of anonymity. Hence, 
the interview data we use and quote in our cases contain 
the speaker’s institutional affiliation and interview date 
(see Appendix). We rely primarily on the 56 interviews 
and we control for consistency by triangulating across 
different data sources: Between different actors and in-
stitutions involved in decision-making, between argu-
ments and actual behaviour, and across the three cases. 
While our findings may reveal if and how expertise mat-
ters in accounting for the Commission’s growing influ-
ence in some intergovernmental issue-areas, our limited 
case selection indicates that further studies are needed 
before any generalisation can be made. 
3. The Case of Security and Defence: The Atlanta 
Military Mission and EUMSS 
Decision-making on Atalanta and the EU Maritime Secu-
rity Strategy  formally falls under the framework of the 
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policies (CSDP), which 
is “subject to specific rules and procedures” (Council of 
the European Union, 2012). Following these procedures, 
decision-making powers formally lie exclusively with the 
Council and its preparatory bodies; decisions are reached 
through unanimity following discussions among the 
member states’ Permanent Representatives and its spe-
cial foreign and security committee, the Political and Se-
curity Committee (PSC). Accordingly, the Commission 
has very limited formal decision-making powers in these 
two cases (Merket, 2012, p. 628). Indeed, within the 
CSDP, the Commission does not have monopoly of initia-
tive, it cannot take cases of non-compliance to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, and it has no budgetary powers 
over EU military missions. The European executive does 
not have formal connections with, or control over, the 
intergovernmental external action units in the new “EU 
foreign service”, the EEAS (Thym, 2011, p. 16).  
3.1. Atalanta 
Launched in December 2008, Atalanta is the EU’s first 
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and still on-going naval operation and allows for the use 
of force to “contribute to the deterrence, prevention 
and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off 
the Somali coast” (Council of the European Union, 2008). 
As with all military EU operations, it is ad hoc, and any 
military contribution is voluntary for the member states. 
Our interviewees revealed that the Commission 
was very much involved in the process leading to the 
launch of Atalanta. “They were in all the meetings” 
(NatDel#4); “involved in the entire process…Meetings, 
correspondence, emails etc.” (NatDel#6). Moreover, 
rather than being a passive observer, the Commission 
“gains influence by sitting in on the meetings” 
(NatDel#5). According to national delegates, NATO of-
ficials, and the Commission itself, it moreover had a 
particular impact on Atalanta through its legal and de-
velopment instruments: It secured agreements with 
countries in the region for transferring suspected pi-
rates (Interviews, 2010, 2013). This was crucial because 
such agreements were a necessary condition for Ata-
lanta’s launch. The member states did not want to 
bring the pirates to Europe out of fear that they might 
seek asylum, while at the same time they were con-
cerned with securing their basic rights (Riddervold, 
2014). The solution was to establish third country 
agreements, and such agreements could not be estab-
lished without the Commission’s involvement. As a na-
tional delegate put it: The member states needed “the 
expertise of DG DEVCO and…Justice” (NatDel#1). Most 
importantly, by working with the Commission, the 
French Presidency could draw on its “financial instru-
ments in order to push for a conclusion of these 
agreements…There were some benefits for the coun-
tries who signed…They got in return some financial 
support from the EU” (NatDel#2). 
But did the Commission use these financial instru-
ments as a bargaining tool to influence Atalanta? The 
data does not support this hypothesis. Contrary to ex-
pectations following the bargaining hypothesis, we did 
not find that the Commission strategically log-rolled or 
threatened its way into the Atalanta decision-making 
process. Similarly, we did not find evidence to suggest 
that the Commission influenced the decision to launch 
Atalanta by cooperating directly with national minis-
tries or officials from other EU institutions to circum-
vent the member states. Instead, we found the Com-
mission’s involvement was wanted by the member 
states and that it cooperated directly with the EU Pres-
idency to realise an EU mission based on its expertise 
across the fields its DGs covered. As an EU parliamen-
tarian interviewee argued, the Commission’s increasing 
involvement in military missions at the informal plan-
ning phase “is also [based] on the expertise” (EP#1). 
The Commission is involved because its competence in 
Community policy-areas makes it “able to advise, on 
what they could do and on the timing, and that can 
lead to some adjustments in the planning” (NatDel#2). 
It “has power through its competences and skills” 
(NatDel#6), and, therefore, “they should be present 
and available for consultation” (NatDel#1). Even within 
the CFSP “it is only the big member states [that]…can 
challenge the Commission’s competence in some are-
as” (NatDel#6). Summarising Commission involvement 
in intergovernmental decision-making nicely, a national 
delegate said: “Where CSDP Security stops and the 
Commission begin, there is an overlap…especially 
when it comes to rule of law” (NatDel#4). 
3.2. EU Maritime Security Strategy 
The Council (2010) adopted its first Conclusions on an 
EU Maritime Security Strategy in April 2010. In Decem-
ber 2013, the European Council (2013, p. 4) tasked the 
EEAS and the Commission to present a joint communi-
cation on “an EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 
2014”. Published in March 2014, the Communication 
contained a list of maritime threats and suggested EU 
actions. The Greek Presidency, however, wanted its 
own paper; it introduced an informal text which the 
“Friends of the Presidency” group discussed six times 
before the General Affairs Council adopted the EUMSS 
in June 2014. While the text changed and some sug-
gested actions removed, the main ideas remained. 
The Commission’s influence is clear in the EUMSS 
case. In 2010, the Council (2010) emphasised that 
preparation would occur within the CFSP/CSDP frame-
work. Nonetheless, the Commission started drafting it 
with the EEAS in mid-2012, co-chairing regular meet-
ings between them (Comm#2─#5; EEAS#1, #3)—18 
months before the European Council tasked them to 
prepare the text. The Commission and the EEAS more-
over were at all the “Friends of the Presidency” meet-
ings, where they spoke and successfully proposed 
amendments (NatDel#8; NatDel#9).  
In particular, we find that the Commission influ-
enced the EUMSS in three central ways. First, it re-
framed the Strategy’s scope so much that “the mem-
ber states” intention was very different from what 
became the process and the outcome (Comm#2). 
While the initial Council decision was for the EEAS to 
explore a military/security-focused EUMSS, the final 
Strategy was cross-sectoral, involving issues under the 
Community integrated maritime policy and other 
Community policy-areas (Comm#1─#5; EEAS#1─#3). 
Second, the Commission literally wrote the Communi-
cation which the member states revised and adopted, 
together with the EEAS. Eleven DGs contributed text 
(e-mail with EEAS#1; EEAS#3). Third, even though the 
EEAS formally led the intergovernmental EUMSS pro-
cess, the Commission successfully introduced “the 
Commission policymaking procedures” for preparing 
the Communication (EEAS#3). Consequently, the 
Communication was “not to be shared with the outside 
world, not even the member states, before it is fin-
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ished” (EEAS#3), and all Commissioners had to sign the 
Communication before its official presentation to the 
Council and its underlying bodies, and the member 
states’ adoption (Comm#2; EEAS#1; EEAS#3). So, then, 
how can we account for the Commission’s influence? 
How, if in any way, was it linked to its expertise? 
Both expert hypotheses find support in the EUMSS 
case. First, the expert arguments hypothesis accounts 
for how the Commission was able to change the Strat-
egy’s scope in line with its preferences for cross-
sectoral maritime security policies. Our interviewees 
tell us that the more cross-sectoral, the wider the im-
plications, and the more likely that the Commission 
would be involved in following-up (Comm#2; 
Comm#5). The “big discussions” between the EEAS and 
the Commission during the Communication drafting 
process were precisely on whether the Strategy should 
be military/security-oriented or cross-sectoral (EEAS#1; 
EEAS#3; Comm#2; Comm#4). Following the 2010 
Council Conclusion, the EEAS suggested to focus on de-
veloping a military-oriented strategy, which the Com-
mission opposed: “We didn’t see the added value” and 
therefore “we stopped the process” (Comm#4). Also ac-
cording to the EEAS, it “came to a standstill […] Because 
it is absolutely not possible to do it without the Commis-
sion […] Sometimes I joke that […] if you read an Ameri-
can maritime security strategy, it is about the employ-
ment and deployment of carrier battle groups. If you 
read the European maritime security strategy, it is all 
about keeping the Commission on board” (EEAS#1).  
When the EEAS re-started the process in 2012, it was 
from the perspective of developing a cross-sectoral 
strategy. However, while the Commission’s bargaining 
tactics placed the cross-sectoral approach on the prepa-
ration table, it also had to convince the EEAS to endorse 
this in the Communication. And in line with the expert 
arguments hypothesis, the Commission convinced the 
EEAS with expert-based argumentation: “A European se-
curity strategy without the involvement of the Commis-
sion is not worth anything because […] you would devise 
the complete wrong instrument for a type of problem 
that is of a completely different nature…you can say 
now we have reconsidered and have said well […] our 
approach to maritime security needs to be comprehen-
sive. This first attempt was not good enough” (EEAS#1. 
Also EEAS#2; EEAS#3). When presented with the Com-
mission’s suggestion, the EEAS “got very interested […] 
they saw the benefit of linking it to the integrated mari-
time policy” (Comm#4). Thus, the cross-sectoral ap-
proach the member states adopted later was “a neces-
sary and logical conclusion of our analysis” (EEAS#1).  
Second, when successfully reframing the EUMSS’s 
scope, the Commission activated its role as an expert 
authority in interlinked Community areas. Eleven DGs 
contributed directly to the Communication based on 
their sectoral skills and knowledge: DG MOVE adding 
text on port and ship security, DG DEV on development 
issues, and DG Taxud on surveillance etc. (Comm#2; 
Comm#3; Comm#5; EEAS#1; EEAS#3). Interestingly, 
lending support to the expert authority hypothesis, both 
Commission and EEAS interviewees said that all DGs’ 
text suggestions were incorporated into the Communi-
cation directly, without any discussions or objections. 
This suggests that, after having agreed to a cross-
sectoral strategy, DG proposals were automatically in-
corporated precisely because they were the recognised 
experts on these issues (Comm#1─#5; EEAS#1─#3). The 
following quote from a Commission official immediate-
ly prior to the Communication’s release is telling: “Dis-
cussions between the DGs and in the meetings and 
with the EEAS have not been so much on the content 
because the text from the different DGs is taken in di-
rectly [into the Communication]” (Comm#2).  
Following the Communication’s publication, the 
Commission also drew on its expert authority to influ-
ence the “Friends of the Presidency” Group’s discussions 
in preparing the June Council meeting. Here, the Greek 
Presidency introduced two substantial changes: reduc-
ing the number of actions and strengthening focus on 
security and defence (authors’ copy). In the final Strate-
gy, however, all but the actions suggesting concrete leg-
islation were re-introduced. During these meetings, the 
Commission spoke and proposed amendments. Accord-
ing to national delegates, the Commission successfully 
proposed amendments because these amendments 
were seen as convincing (NatDel#8; NatDel#9). Most 
importantly, however, the Commission’s attempts to re-
introduce issues succeeded as a result of member states 
wanting to focus on other issues. Since the member 
states’ discussions concentrated on “more important” 
nationally sensitive areas such as maritime surveillance, 
defence capabilities and NATO references, they had little 
interest in debating Commission proposals linked to ex-
isting Community areas. This resulted in most of the 
Commission’s suggestions being kept in the EUMSS, and 
“this gives the Commission a lot of influence” (NatDel#8). 
To sum up: the Commission’s influence appears to be 
linked to its ability to convince the EEAS to initially ac-
cept its arguments for a cross-sectoral approach. 
These observations point to the institutional cir-
cumvention hypothesis as being relevant to fully ac-
count for the Commission’s influence in the EUMSS 
case: It gained its influence through working with the 
EEAS, as well as with the Greek presidency during May 
and June 2014. During the Communication preparation 
process, both EEAS and the Commission consulted 
member states informally (Comm#5; EEAS#1; EEAS#3; 
NatDel#2), anticipating that “every big country has par-
ticular interests” (Comm#4; EEAS#3). However, our in-
terviewees revealed that “the EEAS and the Commis-
sion have been left to themselves” to decide the 
content (Comm#3; Comm#4). “The member states 
have not been involved so much” (Comm#4). Indeed, 
only when the Communication was published did the 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 61-72 67 
PSC and the CSFP decision-making machinery start, 
with the member states’ ambassadors “complain[ing] 
that you did not consult us” (Comm#4).  
According to national delegates, “this whole idea of 
joint communications, that is problematic for the mem-
ber states, because…member states are not involved in 
the drafting […] So that is a mixed blessing, because on 
the one hand they see the advantage of bringing in the 
Commission, sort of this joint communication, on the 
other hand they don’t have control over it” (NatDel#4). 
After the Communication’s publication, the Commission 
worked very closely with bureaucrats from the Greek 
Presidency to prepare texts for the “Friends of the Presi-
dency” meetings (Comm#4; NatDel#8; NatDel#9). One 
of the authors also observed that the Commission 
sought to influence national bureaucrats in between the 
“Friends of the Presidency”/PSC meetings (Observations 
May 2014). To do so, the Commission again drew on its 
expert knowledge, approaching bureaucrats working in 
similar fields and trying to convince them to persuade 
their governments to support particular issues in the 
Communication (Observations May 2014).  
Lastly, the Commission influenced the EUMSS 
through its institutional “know-how”. Specifically, the 
EEAS followed “the Commission’s modus operandi” 
(EEAS#3; EEAS#1; Comm#4─#5) because it lacked an 
established institutional procedure to lead the EUMSS 
process. According to a Commission interviewee, the 
member states “created an EEAS without defining how 
it should function…There is no proper road map lead-
ing to the strategy, no developed procedure” 
(Comm#2). “It took some time to ripen…with the post-
Lisbon world” (EEAS#3). While there was an initial “lack 
of trust” between the two institutions (Comm#5), an 
EEAS interviewee explained that “because you cannot 
keep doing these informal consultations, at some mo-
ment in time you need formal mechanisms, a formal 
structure, and that is what we have designed and cre-
ated” (EEAS#1). Thus, even if joint communications fall 
under the CSDP intergovernmental framework, they 
follow the “normal” Community approach in practice: 
“From an institutional perspective, this will be very 
productive. Now we have a framework, a structure on 
how to work in the future” (Comm#3). 
4. The Case of External Migration: EU Mobility 
Partnerships 
Migration policy is an established issue area in Europe-
an cooperation. Ever since the member states decided 
to realise the “free movement of labour” by removing 
internal border controls, the strengthening of their 
common external borders was considered an essential 
corollary (Geddes, 2008). Hence, through successive 
treaty revisions, from Maastricht to the Lisbon Treaty, 
we see that migration has moved from “an area of 
common interests” for the member states to a “com-
munitarised policy area”. This is now generally under-
stood to mean that the central institutions—i.e., the 
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court 
of Justice—possess their “ordinary” regulatory compe-
tence (Council of the European Union, 2012). We chose 
the “external dimension” of European migration coop-
eration as a case study because it is an exception to 
this “communitarisation” trend. 
Institutional and legal innovations in European mi-
gration policy cooperation, according to several ob-
servers, are not uncommon (Chou, 2009; Peers, 2000; 
van Selm, 2002). In the main, these “exceptions” are 
meant to accommodate the different national prefer-
ences on certain migration issues, notably labour mi-
gration, and to allow the member states to retain deci-
sion-making powers in their hands. Hence, even though 
migration policy cooperation is said to be “communi-
tarised”, we observe that “the right of Member States 
to determine volumes of admission of third-country 
nationals” is not to be compromised (Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, 2012). Put simply, European coopera-
tion on selected migration issues, if and when it occurs, 
would be intergovernmental. Below, we investigate an 
instance of intergovernmental migration cooperation—
the EU mobility partnerships—to consider whether, 
and, if so, how, the Commission influences its decision-
making through expertise. 
Similar to EU’s military operations, EU mobility part-
nerships are ad hoc, voluntary, and involve only those 
member states and partner third countries interested in 
pursuing closer migration cooperation. It is a unique mi-
gration instrument that belongs to the EU’s external pol-
icies and, hence, the decision-making and operational 
rules governing that cooperation are to apply. It is useful 
to note that the origin of EU mobility partnerships stems 
from the Union’s initial failure to adopt a Council di-
rective by the end of the Tampere period (i.e., 2004) 
that would regulate the entry and residence of migrants 
for employment purposes. Noting this in 2006, and 
wanting to promote the “Global Approach to Migration 
(and Mobility)” (GAMM), the European Council invited 
the Commission to propose “how to better organize and 
inform about the various forms of legal movement be-
tween the EU and third countries” (European Commis-
sion, 2007, p. 2). In response, the Commission launched 
the EU mobility partnership in 2007 as a “new instru-
ment” for external migration cooperation.  
To date, the EU has signed seven mobility partner-
ships: with Cape Verde and Moldova in May 2008; 
Georgia (November 2009); Armenia (October 2011); 
Morocco (June 2013); Azerbaijan (December 2013); 
and Tunisia (March 2014) (European Commission, 
2014, p. 2). The EU mobility partnership is now the 
main instrument with which the Union engages with 
the Arab Spring countries in the migration sector. Given 
the overall trend towards “communitarisation” in this 
sector, this turn towards preferring intergovernmental 
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cooperation and its successful expansion is fascinating. 
Indeed, it allows us to approach the role of Commission 
expertise, as well as inter-institutional dynamics more 
generally, from another angle: How and why did the 
member states fail to prevent the European executive 
from influencing intergovernmental processes? This 
question points to an underlying assumption about the 
“nature” of intergovernmental cooperation in European 
integration, namely, that it involves only national offi-
cials representing the participating member states at 
the “expense” of central institutions. As briefly noted 
at the beginning, there are a growing number of stud-
ies pointing to the Commission’s increased influence in 
areas where it lacks or has limited competence. As we 
shall show below, its cross-sectoral expert knowledge 
is a crucial contributing factor to this development. 
To start, there is evidence to confirm that the par-
ticipating member states did not seek to exclude the 
Commission from the preparation, negotiation, and 
even the implementation of the mobility partnerships. 
Put differently, the member states “failed” to prevent 
the Commission because they never intended to do so 
in the first place. Indeed, the Commission has been the 
coordinator in this process. In interviews with Frontex 
officials, Djupedal (2011, p. 40) described the Commis-
sion as the “node” around which the implementation 
of EU─Cape Verde mobility partnership revolved: “we 
have regular meetings in Brussels, and we are all invit-
ed by the Commission. We discuss proposals […] and 
the progress of the mobility partnership is measured 
[by] the Commission task force”. Confirming that the 
Commission’s involvement was welcomed, we find that 
it is even a signatory to the EU mobility partnerships 
and some of its proposals were also included (see An-
nex of all mobility partnerships). This led an official 
from the legal service of the Council’s General-
Secretariat to remark that the EU mobility partnership 
is legally “experimental” because the Commission also 
signs (quoted in Chou & Gibert, 2012, p. 210). Others 
have noted its “non-binding nature” (House of Lords, 
2012, p. 53) and “soft legal nature” (Van Vooren, 2012, 
p. 210), pointing to the “flexibility” that EU mobility 
partnership offers to the participating states. 
The inclusion of the Commission in the EU mobility 
partnerships did not mean that the member states 
were not cautious or inattentive to its role or influence. 
On the contrary, Reslow (2012, p. 228) argues that the 
Commission was very much a “Limited Policy Initiator”. 
This is because the EU mobility partnerships were de-
signed to consider the possibility of labour mobility be-
tween participating member states and third countries. 
According to her, “Member states will indicate when 
the Commission is going too far in its proposals, for in-
stance by incorporating issues which they see as falling 
under their competence, or which are particularly sen-
sitive” (Reslow, 2012, p. 229). This perspective, howev-
er, does not explain the Commission’s active role in this 
process. Indeed, Reslow (2012, p. 229) admits that it 
was the Commission that “suggested potential partner 
countries, gauged the level of interest of the member 
states, conducted exploratory talks with partner coun-
tries, and had a coordinating role in the negotiations 
between the member states and partner countries”. So 
why is the Commission a central actor in the prepara-
tions and negotiations for EU mobility partnerships?  
Our findings lend support to the expert authority 
hypothesis in two ways. First, the Commission has the 
cross-sectoral knowledge of the three issues at the 
heart of mobility partnerships: development (i.e., ca-
pacity-building, training), migration and security (bor-
der management, trafficking, asylum, return, labour 
market access, visa facilitation). At the departmental-
level, the corresponding Commission DGs involved at 
the time included Home (lead DG), Development, and 
Aid (Djupedal, 2011, p. 39). Similar to its role in drafting 
the EUMSS, the Commission also prepared the GAMM, 
which outlined the mobility partnerships’ operational 
goals, and was responsible for GAMM’s subsequent re-
porting (European Commission, 2011). Unlike the 
EUMSS, however, the Commission was not responsible 
for widening the scope of GAMM, which strategically 
linked development with migration and security. Ac-
cording to Chou (2012b, pp. 22-24), EU high-level dis-
cussions concerning how to operationalise the “migra-
tion-development nexus” for achieving security goals 
have been on-going since the late 1990s (cf. Lavenex & 
Kunz, 2008). By tasking the Commission to explore 
ways of implementing the GAMM, and, in so doing, ac-
knowledging its expert authority on these issues, the 
European Council also paved the way for its inclusion in 
the intergovernmental decision-making. 
Second, more than some participating member 
states, the Commission has the organisational “know-
how” and resources to make negotiating and imple-
menting the mobility partnerships possible. In terms of 
coordination, DG Home acted as the nerve centre in 
Brussels with EU delegations at the capitals of partici-
pating third countries (Dakar, Praia) its nerve extension 
(Djupedal, 2011, pp. 39-42). According to our Commis-
sion interviewee (Comm#6), EU delegations prepared 
the meetings in partner third countries, while DG 
Home, liaising with their missions in Brussels, would 
oversee those meetings. Similar to the case of Atalan-
ta, the Commission’s considerable tools in the devel-
opment sector (i.e., aid and field knowledge) were cru-
cial: They enticed partner third countries to the talks 
(Chou & Gibert, 2012), and provided the specialist 
knowledge on the grounds. DG Development officials 
accompanied DG Home official regularly at the start of 
negotiations (Comm#6; Comm#7; Comm#8). We found 
that the Commission did not use development aid as a 
bargaining tool to insert itself at the negotiation table; 
it also did not circumvent or convinced the member 
states with expert arguments. Several DG Home inter-
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viewees (Comm#6; Comm#9) revealed what the mem-
ber states appreciated the most: Regularly updated 
scoreboard showing not only progress, but also those 
responsible for task implementation (i.e., which mem-
ber state, EU agency, third country ministry or agency, 
or the Commission). To sum up, these attributes made 
the Commission a “one-stop-shop” for the member 
states when they sought a reliable coordinator to assist 
in these intergovernmental arrangements. 
Finally, examining the failed negotiations with Sene-
gal to conclude an EU mobility partnership offers anoth-
er insight concerning the Commission’s role in intergov-
ernmental decision processes. The Commission 
approached Cape Verde and Senegal at the same time, 
but suspended talks with the latter due to a lack of pro-
gress. According to Chou and Gibert (2012, p. 409), this 
failure can be attributed to a combination of factors, no-
tably the “unfavourable cost-benefit calculus by the 
French and Senegalese parties to the negotiation” and 
“an unclear and awkward negotiating strategy on the 
part of the European Commission”. They showed that 
France was not interested in an EU instrument oversee-
ing its well-functioning bilateral migration cooperation 
with its former colony. Quoting a French interviewee in 
Dakar, Chou and Gibert (2012, p. 420) tell us that 
“‘France will be happy to take part in the mobility part-
nership if Senegal is willing” […] but “France […] does not 
wish to take the lead on this and will stay behind the 
EU’”. It is France’s unwillingness to openly oppose these 
talks that lead us to propose that the Commission has 
another function in intergovernmental discussions with 
third countries: it represents the Union in the absence of 
a united front. While this mobility partnership did not 
materialise, our findings showed that the Commission 
exercised considerable influence through its expertise 
during these intergovernmental decision processes. 
5. Conclusion 
This article set out to consider whether and, if so, how 
the Commission’s expert knowledge contributed to ac-
counting for empirical observations of its growing in-
fluence in intergovernmental policy-areas. We find 
that, indeed, the Commission’s use of expertise cap-
tures much of its de facto influence in issue-areas 
where its competence remains formally limited. By dis-
tinguishing between two expertise-based hypotheses 
(expert authority and expert arguments), we are able 
to say more about how its expertise matters than the 
existing literature provides. Specifically, in several of 
our cases, the Commission used its expert arguments 
to influence the member states’ and other actors—
most notably the EEAS’—positions on common poli-
cies. Most importantly, in all cases the Commission in-
formed decision-making by successfully linking discus-
sions to policy-areas where it possesses expert 
authority. This suggests that, despite the member 
states’ attempts to formally maintain a division be-
tween “Community” and “intergovernmental” policies, 
this division is difficult to enforce in practice given the 
centrality of the Commission’s expertise in informing 
the member states’ subsequent policy decisions. This 
mutual reliance may be one of the “hidden” dynamics 
of European integration that helps us make sense of 
how and why European cooperation has intensified 
and deepened in sectors and on issue-areas at the 
heart of national sovereignty.  
Our findings revealed that, while expertise accounts 
substantially for our empirical observations of growing 
Commission influence in formally intergovernmental 
EU policy-areas, bargaining tactics and institutional cir-
cumvention are also important. Our limited number of 
case studies suggests that these are fruitful avenues for 
further research before any generalisation can be 
made about Commission expertise in intergovernmen-
tal policy-areas. The EUMSS in particular is still a work 
in progress (in terms of implementation), so any con-
clusions about the “real” influence of the Commission 
would be premature at this stage. While our frame-
work offers the first step for an improved understanding 
of the different functions of expertise in EU decision-
making processes, we believe that, in particular, our ex-
pert arguments hypothesis can be usefully applied to in-
vestigate how transnational non-governmental actors 
may affect intergovernmental agreements and out-
comes more generally. To sum up, this article suggests 
that it is the Commission’s expert arguments and invok-
ing of expert authority that have paved the way for how 
it can exercise its Treaty powers in intergovernmental 
and non-communitarised issue-areas. 
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